Updated: CEUDA Report Part 2 (clauses 1.28 to 1.89) to Senate Committee on National Security and Defence

Update: "a culture of deception"

Border crossing agents walk off job citing right to refuse dangerous work

Border inspectors stepped down yesterday morning at the Ambassador Bridge between Windsor and Detroit, which is Canada's business land crossing for both cars and trucks; the Blue Water Bridge at Sarnia, Ont., the country's second-busiest truck crossing; and at the Detroit to Windsor tunnel [. . . . ]

See below for some of the problems. CEUDA is the union for CBSA.

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What is below was originally posted Nov. 10, 05

On Frost Hits the Rhubarb, Nov. 4, 05, I posted part of this submission, from the Introduction to clause 1.29. This post includes the rest of that report, along with some other information.

Deputy Minister Anne McLellan is responsible for CBSA. There is some information on the President of the CBSA, Alain Jolicoeur who may be less well-known and the rest of the CEUDA submission.


Today, there are five sections:

1. CEUDA highlighted phrases / clauses CEUDA (clauses 1.28 to 1.89) -- for those who want to skim -- that will show you why it is important to you as a citizen and to the border guards, themselves. These are the phrases I had highlighted on first reading. For the all of the rest of the report not posted Nov. 4, 05 scroll to "5. Ceuda Report Part 2 (clauses 1.28 to 1.89)"


2. Background: Alain Jolicoeur, President of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)

3. The repercussions for whistleblowers -- Airport security firm suspends employee who spoke to CBC News

4. Links to other information -- such as the Fifth Estate program on insecurity -- see it in repeat this weekend.

5. CEUDA Report Part 2 (clauses 1.28 to 1.89)

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1. CEUDA highlighted phrases / clauses

Assume [. . . . ] after each.

contrary to what Mr. Jolicoeur stated

the job hazard analysis was altered

evidence says quite the opposite to what Mr. Jolicoeur tried to convince the House of Commons Subcommittee members.

not the only instances where Mr. Jolicoeur can be found to have intentionally led people astray or failed to accurately report

Someone, as of yet undetermined, instructed Moduspec that this specific armed presence recommendation was to be removed, and the Report was altered to meet this instruction.

deliberate alteration

The draft version recognized that there was considerable risk to unarmed border inspectors

The final version of ModuSpec's Job Hazard Analysis omitted this recommendation and simply recommended that officers not be armed [ Search: RCMP Commissioner Zaccardelli ]

the job hazard analysis was altered

the most senior officials within the CBSA continue to attempt to deliberately mislead elected officials and the Canadian public

institutionalized bias against Customs Officers

Despite non co-operation and attempts to obstruct the study by CBSA’s senior management in Ottawa

How can the CBSA President continue to publicly say police response times to calls from Customs are adequate when CBSA doesn’t even know the distance of police detachments to more than 90% of the sites serviced by Customs?

OPP unilaterally changed the MOU in Prescott, ON, to no longer respond to firearms seizures insisting that Customs Investigators attend from Ottawa in these matters; these investigators are routinely instructed not to attend by CBSA management resulting in subjects being released into Canada after attempting to smuggle firearms;

a review and analysis we undertook led us to note there are about 250 unguarded roads coming into Canada from the U.S., and no one, absolutely no one, is watching these roads, checking who comes across them or what they’re bringing into Canada.

given RCMP Commissioner Zaccardelli's testimony about how the RCMP cannot maintain a border presence; we shouldn't confuse the RCMP's involvement in IBETs with the U.S. Border Patrol to mean there are joint Canada/U.S. teams patrolling the border.

specialized intelligence-driven teams such as IBET’s can only operate effectively if field officers are out there gathering and obtaining day-to-day intelligence on activities and movement on the front-line.

1.68 Canada needs to establish an armed Customs Border Patrol (CBP). The RCMP clearly does not want to do the work of patrolling the border but the work must be done. Customs can do that work, has the expertise, infrastructure, and management team already in place along the border, and our members know the terrain and travellers better than anyone.

we wish to take this opportunity to restate the need for senior CBSA officials to provide nothing short of completely accurate information when presenting information to Parliamentary Committees and advice to elected officials, especially the Minister to whom they report.

King and Waugh v. Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (January 13, 2005;
File # 160-2-83). As you may be aware, CBSA unlawfully ordered destruction of officer safety related information, as confirmed by the PSSRB in this decision.

we urge you to explore them further by questioning CBSA officials.

1.84 CBSA uses a Border Management Plan (BMP) to set artificial numerical targets for vehicle and vessel searches, without regard to the goal of finding contraband or any result beyond the search itself. Literally, this “numbers game” is a public relations exercise that focuses on having more searches performed rather than on finding anything. In fact, intelligence based, targeted high-risk searches are routinely discouraged because of the time involved to carry out such searches and so that easier searches – to pad the numbers – can occur. As you know, more security is not necessarily better security, although it does permit unreliable claims to be made.

1.85 Linked to that deceit is a system of management bonuses based on managers achieving BMP numerical quotas and for running operations under budget. Providing financial incentives to managers in this fashion is an outright encouragement to avoid doing enforcement related duties, which does nothing short of corrupt the law enforcement mandate of CBSA.

1.86 There is a widespread policy, despite Front-Line Customs Officer objection, to admit persons into Canada notwithstanding the fact they were caught attempting to smuggle guns or drugs into Canada. This constitutes criminal inadmissibility under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

1.87 As is always the case we are in a position to substantiate these newer findings and it is our hope that you will question CBSA officials in a view of seeking explanations for what has been reported to us and what justifications exists for such measures that are clearly contradictory to the public interest of Canadians.

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2. Background: Alain Jolicoeur

Alain Jolicoeur, the President of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) wrote a letter to the editor which was published in the National Post, in response to some of what has been reported about Canada's insecurity. It was published since Nov. 4, 05, in reaction to the negative press garnered after the contents of the CEUDA report became more widely known.

It is always instructive to know the background of ministers and deputy ministers.

Background: Alain Jolicoeur, President, CBSA

Mr. Alain Jolicoeur completed his classical education at the Collège de Haute-Rive.

[CEGEP
www.cegep-baie-comeau.qc.ca/college/historique.htm ]

He went on to earn a bachelor's degree in physics engineering at Université Laval [Québec] and pursued studies in meteorology at the Université du Québec à Montréal.

Mr. Jolicoeur began his career in the Public Service of Canada in 1973 and, until 1980, held various positions in the field of meteorology with Environment Canada and the Department of National Defence. From 1980 to 1992, Mr. Jolicoeur held management positions in engineering, technology transfer, technological development, and the state of the environment.

[1992] Subsequently, Mr. Jolicoeur joined the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat as head of human resources for the Government of Canada. In July 1999, he became Associate Deputy Minister of National Revenue and Deputy Commissioner of the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA).

In September 2002, Mr. Jolicoeur was named Deputy Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs. He occupied this position until December 12, 2003, when he became President of the Canada Border Services Agency.

3. The repercussions for whistleblowers

Airport security firm suspends employee who spoke to CBC News -- "An airport security worker in Ottawa has been suspended with pay, after talking to CBC News." Last Updated Wed, 09 Nov 2005, CBC

INDEPTH: Airport Security

Bill Butler told The Fifth Estate that security at airports is, at times, "a joke." A passenger screener, Butler said Canadian airports are far less secure than they appear. "It's what I call the illusion of security, that's what I call it."

Butler said he was only trying to do what's best for the flying public. He works for a private company called Aeroguard, which provides passenger screening to the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority [CATSA], the agency in charge of security at Canada's airports.

He says he's "angry, bitter after being suspended. It hurts. They seem to be taking what I've done the wrong way ... [I was] just trying to point out the flaws and they feel like I'm attacking them."
A vice-president at Aeroguard says Butler's suspension is related to the Fifth Estate report and an investigation into his conduct is underway.

The Fifth Estate report says passenger safety is at risk in Canada.

Search:

Canadian Air Transport Security Authority [CATSA]
Minister of Transport Jean Lapierre
decipher access codes
Steve Elson, a former U.S. Navy SEAL and a former agent for the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration

4. Links to other information

For more, check: here
http://newsbeat1.com/2005/11/
well-it-looks-like-more-work-for.html

The fifth Estate will be repeating the program, Fri.Sat. And Sun for those who missed it.
http://www.cbc.ca/fifth/
fastenseatbelts/index.html

CBC article
http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/
national/2005/11/09/airport051109.html

Another here
http://www.cbc.ca/toronto/story/
to-airportsecurity09112005.html





5. CEUDA Report Part 2 (clauses 1.28 to 1.89)

1.28 The evidence we gather from our members who work at the border says quite the opposite to what Mr. Jolicoeur tried to convince the House of Commons Subcommittee members. For example of the 17 vehicles documented in Lacolle during a three-week period in December 2004 (referred to above in paragraph 1.24), none were brought back to the port by police in spite of a full description having been immediately provided to police in each case.

1.29 CEUDA submitted an ATIP request asking exactly how many “port-running” vehicles are actually caught by police and returned to Customs and Immigration for processing. While CBSA’s ATIP Office has yet to respond, we don’t expect to learn that CBSA keeps track of these statistics and, if it does, that we’ll learn most are never caught and brought back to the border contrary to what Mr. Jolicoeur stated.

1.30 It needs to be noted that our information from Customs Officers on the front lines is that the numbers provided to you by the CBSA is a gross underestimation of the number of vehicles that actually do not stop or that do not report to Customs as required by law. We are in the process of gathering more information on this and will present it to you upon completion. One thing is however very clear in the minds of Customs Officers: only on very rare occasions are “port-runners” ever caught and brought back for processing.

1.31 Mr. Ménard then asked the logical follow-up question to which Mr. Jolicoeur answered, as follows:
Mr. Serge Ménard: The simplest response would have been to say that you run after these people and catch them, but that was not your answer. You stated that you call the police. What police force do you call and how long does it take for the police to arrive?
Mr. Alain Jolicoeur: I cannot give you a general answer to that question. It depends what location you are talking about. As you know, a police force is always designated under a local agreement. Each border crossing has an agreement. That is how things operate. (Emphasis added by CEUDA)

1.32 Again, evidence says quite the opposite to what Mr. Jolicoeur tried to convince the House of Commons Subcommittee members.

1.33 Unfortunately, these were not the only instances where Mr. Jolicoeur can be found to have intentionally led people astray or failed to accurately report on the state of affairs.

1.34 Some of the following paragraphs paraphrase from an October 6, 2005 letter I sent to the Honourable Bill Graham, Minister of National Defence, and copied to the Chair of this Committee.
1.35 In 2002, as a result of a series of ongoing complaints from our members because they were not issued side-arms to enforce the Criminal Code, the CBSA, CEUDA, and Labour Programs of HRDC (formerly Labour Canada) agreed that the CCRA would contract a consulting firm to carry out a job hazard analysis of the work of Customs Officers. Moduspec was the firm selected by the CCRA and they completed on site inspections and interviews. In early 2003, Moduspec provided the CCRA with its Draft Report and Recommendations.

1.36 The original Recommendations included a specific reference to providing for an armed police presence at Canada’s 6 biggest border crossings with the U.S. as a matter of officer safety. Someone, as of yet undetermined, instructed Moduspec that this specific armed presence recommendation was to be removed, and the Report was altered to meet this instruction. When it was released by the Government on February 5, 2003, no reference was made to the original armed presence recommendation and instead the Report recommended Customs Officers not be issued with side-arms.

1.37 This deliberate alteration on an issue supposedly under direct consideration was discovered by CEUDA a number of weeks later when copies of the original report were provided anonymously to the Union. Both the CCRA and Moduspec confirmed the fact of the deliberate alteration to media inquiries thereafter. This is also confirmed specifically by your June 2005 report.

1.38 The following is from your own June 2005 report.

1.39 To Arm or Not to Arm Inspectors: The ModuSpec Job Hazard Analysis

1.40 The government has supported its policy not to arm border officials with a 2003 Job Hazard Analysis performed by ModuSpec Risk Management Services for the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency. In it, ModuSpec recommended against arming border inspectors. The Committee gained access to copies of both the final analysis and the working draft that was presented to the CCRA's National Health and Safety Policy Committee.

1.41 The draft version recognized that there was considerable risk to unarmed border inspectors at some locations and while it recommended against arming border inspectors, it did recommend that the government increase or ensure police presence for the "confidence and peace of mind for border officers.

1.42 The final version of ModuSpec's Job Hazard Analysis omitted this recommendation and simply recommended that officers not be armed (see Appendix XI). It is unclear why there is a difference between the two versions. When asked, CBSA President Alain Jolicoeur testified to the Committee, "I am not aware of any request to alter the report.”

1.43 Jolicoeur suggested that the Committee ask ModuSpec. The Committee did. In response, ModuSpec General Manager Stephan Zuberec wrote: “It is ModuSpec’s practice to provide clients with draft reports for review and comment prior to issuing a final report. Typically, the client will contribute comments, additions, deletions and other edits to the draft report that they want included in the final report. “This practice would have been applied to the draft report that was submitted to the National Health and Safety Policy Committee.

1.44 In other words, the job hazard analysis was altered.

1.45 Having, himself, never acknowledged the deliberate, material, alteration of the Report, Mr. Jolicoeur and CBSA continue to rely on this Report and give advice to elected officials that it somehow independently justifies a conclusion that an ongoing armed presence is not required at the border. We are gravely concerned that senior managers of CCRA and CBSA have deliberately altered a third party report by deleting a safety‑focused recommendation. Further, it is more than disconcerting that the most senior officials within the CBSA continue to attempt to deliberately mislead elected officials and the Canadian public by suggesting a report they know to have been falsified ‘justifies’ inaction on this matter of public and officer safety. This is reinforced by the fact that sections 125(1) (q) and (s) of Part II of the Canada Labour Code create specific information related obligations on the employer regarding employee safety which this action of concealment may trigger.

1.46 It is ironic to note that in just the past few months police officers have been called to border crossings in southern Ontario in response to situations of correctly perceived danger; in each case they were there to intercept a suspected armed and dangerous fugitive. In two of these cases they were waiting with firearms drawn and at the ready. Customs Officers are not afforded that same safety measure. It is nothing short of shameful that peace officers acting in service of their fellow Canadians are exposed to this kind of safety risk.

1.47 You may also be unaware that the same senior management of CBSA that promotes this falsified Moduspec Report instructs Customs Officers that when confronted with such risks they are to ‘withdraw’ and permit armed and dangerous individuals unhindered entry into Canada. Officers are then instructed to notify police, who are, of course, not on site, in the usually forlorn hope of their interception of the dangerous person. CEUDA and its members have sadly concluded that Officer and public safety is being sacrificed on the altar of bureaucratic ego that refuses to admit change is required.

1.48 Another ATIP request we made with CBSA sought to find out exactly how many armed and dangerous criminals Customs Officers have released into Canada unhindered as per CBSA policy over the past few years. Troubling as it may be, the CBSA again logs absolutely no data on these matters. In other words, they do not know and obviously do not want to know how many times this happens.

1.49 This becomes even more disturbing given CBSA database systems don’t regularly tell Customs Officers on the front-line when someone is considered to be armed and dangerous, which not only prohibits them from adhering to the withdraw and release policy but also puts them and their colleagues who do secondary examinations of these individuals at grave risk of bodily harm or even death. This is another troubling reality that was captured in your June report.

1.50 It has been said that the RCMP Commissioner does not support an armed Customs Officer presence at the border. RCMP Commissioner Zaccardelli, as you know, is also Deputy Minister in the same Department responsible for the continuing use of the falsified ModuSpec Report. With the greatest of respect, the Commissioner’s position is more a reflection on his apparent complete ignorance regarding the law enforcement duties expected of Customs Officers than a credible insight about whether there is a need for an armed presence at the border. Inasmuch as the training required as a pre-condition for firearms issuance would be at least the same as that required for the RCMP, the Commissioner appears to lack faith in the capacity of all police officers to deal with side-arm issuance.

1.51 It is Commissioner Zaccardelli, after all, who was quoted in media as saying he would hate to see Customs Officers with guns jump out of their huts and shoot at cars blowing past. This is yet another indication of the Commissioner’s lack of knowledge regarding law enforcement work expected of Customs Officers at the border. Further, it is quite disconcerting that someone holding the Office of RCMP Commissioner carries such an institutionalized bias against Customs Officers to the point he feels compelled to try and paint them as dangerously untrustworthy of side-arm issuance.

1.52 Fortunately, the Government of Canada relies on other police entities for advice on matters related to law enforcement generally and firearms specifically. Since 1994, the Canadian Professional Police Association (formerly the Canadian Police Association) has been a group whose expertise the Government has sought and consistently publicly cited for its various criminal justice initiatives – especially in relation to firearms. As such, we know that you will be interested to learn that the Executive Board of the Canadian Professional Police Association has fully endorsed CEUDA’s position that Border Services Officers working at border crossings be equipped with sidearms. This affirmation from one of Canada’s most credible law enforcement organizations is a complete answer to the inaccurate belief that the police are opposed to the arming of Border Services Officers.

1.53 In light of the foregoing, we trust you can appreciate the depth and extent of misinformation that has been given and why it is critical that you receive accurate information on these important subjects.

1.54 It is precisely for these reasons that CEUDA has commissioned its own independent risk analysis review by the renowned Northgate Group on the specific issue of side-arms. This review is currently underway. Despite non co-operation and attempts to obstruct the study by CBSA’s senior management in Ottawa, the study has already heard from more Customs Officers than the ModuSpec Report. And note the ModuSpec report attributed a mere 2 pages of text to the complicated question of side-arms for Customs Officers. In large numbers, Officers as well as some front-line managers from across Canada have been attending off site interviews to ensure their voices are heard. All we have ever asked for is a fair analysis, unburdened by pre-determined outcomes. We can assure you that we remain determined to have it, as we know you do.

1.55 Senators, please accept this presentation as a confirmation that the Northgate Report will be provided to you, unaltered, upon its completion.

1.56 There are exactly 1,065 sites serviced by Customs across Canada, broken down as follows:
119 highway crossings;
13 international airports;
193 other airports in Canada that Customs must also service mainly for private aircraft;
716 marine installations serviced by Customs; and
24 rail sites.

1.57 Canada Customs knows the distance of police detachments to only 114 of these sites. How can the CBSA President continue to publicly say police response times to calls from Customs are adequate when CBSA doesn’t even know the distance of police detachments to more than 90% of the sites serviced by Customs? We have put in an ATIP request asking what police response times were for calls by CBSA and we continue to wait for a response. Calls to our National Office from ATIP staff at CBSA seeking details about our request lead us to believe CBSA does not record police response times across Canada when calls are made by Customs seeking police assistance.

1.58 About the supposed agreements between Customs and local police forces Mr. Jolicoeur said exist for such things as chasing “port-runners”, our members have told us the following:
Many work locations have no Memorandums of Agreement (MOU’s) with police whatsoever;
The only agreements we were able to consistently locate were those that exist for the specific need that arises when police are required to pick up already arrested criminals, for example, impaired drivers or individuals for whom an arrest warrant was issued and which was executed by Customs;
OPP unilaterally changed the MOU in Prescott, ON, to no longer respond to firearms seizures insisting that Customs Investigators attend from Ottawa in these matters; these investigators are routinely instructed not to attend by CBSA management resulting in subjects being released into Canada after attempting to smuggle firearms;
Police have many other jobs to do and response time is a problem that is becoming increasingly worse day by day; this is not a complaint against police given we know Police Officers are doing their best under the circumstances; and
There are absolutely no other agreements in place that we are aware of or that CBSA ATIP could produce, despite a May 2005 ATIP request, that speaks to this supposed police mandate to chase down anyone who blows by a Customs point-of-entry. In fact, MP Serge Ménard tells us, as an example, that he knows for a fact that no such agreements exist between Customs and the QPP or RCMP in Québec.

1.59 We’re quite convinced based on this evidence that the Committee would find more interesting information if it delved into the situation with more vigour and perseverance. Naturally, once CBSA’s ATIP office responds with a list of agreements that do exist, if any, we will be more than pleased to share a copy with the Committee.

1.60 As if the problems weren’t worrisome enough, a review and analysis we undertook led us to note there are about 250 unguarded roads coming into Canada from the U.S., and no one, absolutely no one, is watching these roads, checking who comes across them or what they’re bringing into Canada. As already mentioned, we know from talking with city officials that in Standstead, Quebec, some 250 vehicles enter Canada via Leeball Road and Church Road each month. That’s nearly 60 vehicles per week, on just 2 of some 250 unguarded roads. A good number of these roads can easily accommodate any type of vehicle; with some paved and even ploughed in the winter.

1.61 And lest we forget that these figures don’t include boat traffic across waterways where the honour system is given the greatest of emphasis. Customs has telephone reporting stations. Boaters are asked to dock, then phone Customs, then wait for Customs to show up if dispatched. Of course if anyone is in the business of smuggling people or goods across the border, the last thing they will do is dock in compliance and keep illegal persons or goods on their boat, and wait for Customs to show up and make arrests or seize the boat!

1.62 Commissioner Zaccardelli says pulling away from the border is okay. He even testified before the House of Commons Justice, Human Rights, and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Committee on March 22 that the RCMP’s “main mandate in Quebec is not to be a visible police force”. He went on to testify that the RCMP would only make their way to the border in the context of an intelligence driven operation or an investigation. Law enforcement specialists all agree that visible patrolling is the strongest existing means by which to discourage violations of the law. When questioned on this, Commissioner Zaccardelli referred to pre-emptive patrolling as nothing more than an exercise in “burning gas”, implying border patrolling is, in his mind, a total waste.

1.63 Government officials are placing much emphasis on International Border Enforcement Teams, or IBETs, espousing their virtues and promoting them as the ideal solution for border security. However, as this quote from the CBSA’s own website points out, IBETs "operate as intelligence-driven enforcement teams"; they identify, investigate, and interdict "persons and organizations that pose a threat to national security or are engaged in other criminal activity." The U.S. Border Patrol and Canada's RCMP have assumed the lead roles but, given RCMP Commissioner Zaccardelli's testimony about how the RCMP cannot maintain a border presence; we shouldn't confuse the RCMP's involvement in IBETs with the U.S. Border Patrol to mean there are joint Canada/U.S. teams patrolling the border. IBET's are extremely important however they are intelligence-driven and not at all field-driven. These are two very distinct aspects of law enforcement, which complement each other. In fact, one does not need to be a crime prevention expert to realize that specialized intelligence-driven teams such as IBET’s can only operate effectively if field officers are out there gathering and obtaining day-to-day intelligence on activities and movement on the front-line.

1.64 Inspector Jean Yves Lemoine, Officer in Charge of IBETs, was quoted in an article of the Pony Express (the Nov/Dec 2002 issue of the RCMP national internal magazine), as saying “People think that we’re out there in marked cars doing border patrol. That’s just not what IBET is about.” The article describes an IBET as “comprised of joint teams of investigators who gather intelligence related to national security and organized crime. This information is passed on to analysts who identify major threats within each of the 15 geographical regions. This information is then communicated to other IBET regions through a shared database. The team brings in the necessary specialists, such as drug investigators or commercial crime investigators, to deal with the needs of that particular investigation.”

1.65 If IBETs were the solution to border enforcement in lieu of having RCMP Detachments along the border, or in lieu of an armed Customs Border Patrol, then shouldn’t the Americans be dismantling their Border Patrol instead of continuing to staff their now more than 1,000 strong Border Patrol force along the Canadian border? Does Commissioner Zaccardelli know something our American partners don’t?

1.66 Senators, there is a great lack of law enforcement along our border with the U.S. today. It exists at points-of-entry for many reasons, some of which you delved into and reported on in your June 2005 report but most notably because of the sheer and overwhelming absence of any personnel whatsoever dedicated to enforcing our border between points-of-entry. It is nothing short of shocking that security at our border has become so ill managed and that managers have been allowed to so poorly set priorities about what needs or doesn’t need to be done.

1.67 You may be interested to know we have consulted with the Minister’s office on this matter in some detail. The following outlines where, in our view, the next steps need to be taken.

1.68 Canada needs to establish an armed Customs Border Patrol (CBP). The RCMP clearly does not want to do the work of patrolling the border but the work must be done. Customs can do that work, has the expertise, infrastructure, and management team already in place along the border, and our members know the terrain and travellers better than anyone. We make this recommendation above and beyond our mutual position that there also needs to be an armed presence at border crossings. CEUDA also fully supports the call to re-open RCMP Detachments along the border.

1.69 The CBP should be organized as a separate Branch under CBSA, and should be comprised of some 500 FTE’s across Canada. We estimate the cost of operating the CBP should not exceed $80M broken down as follows: $50M for salaries and benefits (assuming approximately $100,000 per FTE, which factors in salary, benefits, and overtime), another $10M for the purchase of approximately 200 vehicles costing approximately $50,000 each, and an additional $20M to cover operation costs. We estimate an additional $25M start-up cost for the 1st year given the initial refurbishing of port office space and the primary purchase of security equipment such as side-arms, outfitting vehicles, and radios. Further, given the RCMP withdrawal from these types of duties, this may simply require a re-allocation of funds rather than new expenditures.

1.70 A specific job description will need to be created for the position of an armed Customs Border Patrol Officer.

1.71 Individuals will need to qualify for the position accordingly and may come from varying law-enforcement backgrounds, with the priority going to those already within the Customs Service.

1.72 The CBP should be the first-response team, mandated to patrol the border, between points-of-entry and working in partnership with the RCMP and other police forces, the latter of whom would act as the second-response partner along the border at and between points-of-entry.

1.73 The CBP could also be involved in direct assistance at Customs points-of-entry, especially in smaller operations. Nevertheless, let us be clear that, like you, we remain firmly of the view that no officer should be working alone at any Canadian points-of-entry ever, under any circumstances.

1.74 We have no doubt Americans would see this step in a very positive light and highly reflective of a growing commitment on the part of Canada to enforce its shared border with the U.S., where gun and cannabis smuggling as well as the ever-growing fear associated with terrorism are becoming major problems for citizens and politicians on both sides.

1.75 An armed CBP may not be the complete solution to enforcement problems faced at points-of-entry, but it would be a solid step in the right direction.

1.76 CEUDA is not the only organization to call for a CBP. In fact, no less than 48 community councils along the border have adopted firm Resolutions since March this year specifically calling for a Customs Border Patrol.

1.77 Furthermore, in early June this year, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (CFM) adopted at its annual conference in St. John’s, Newfoundland, an Emergency Resolution calling on the federal government to give to the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) the first-response mandate to patrol the border between points-of-entry while working in partnership with the RCMP and other police forces.

1.78 In this respect, we, supported by many communities on the border, and the FCM, call on your Committee to ensure the mandate of the CBSA, as outlined in Bill C‑26 is encompassing enough to give authority to the Minister to establish an armed Customs Border Patrol at CBSA without having to seek future amendments to the Canada Border Services Agency Act. If this is not possible, we ask the Committee to amend the Bill accordingly, and we have great confidence given our work with Members of Parliament on this very issue that such an amendment would receive wide support in the House of Commons.

1.79 On a broader note, we wish to take this opportunity to restate the need for senior CBSA officials to provide nothing short of completely accurate information when presenting information to Parliamentary Committees and advice to elected officials, especially the Minister to whom they report. This means officials should refrain from making up answers to downplay questions about problems in border enforcement, especially when information in keeping with those answers does not exist. No one wins when the truth is obscured, especially when we are talking about issues that prohibit provision of duty of care by senior government officials toward Front-Line Customs Officers.

1.80 It is time these officials accept and recognize the evidence before them and ensure that border security is adequate rather than direct alteration of reports and destruction of relevant safety information, the latter of which occurred in King and Waugh v. Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (January 13, 2005;
File # 160-2-83). As you may be aware, CBSA unlawfully ordered destruction of officer safety related information, as confirmed by the PSSRB in this decision. It is nothing short of shocking that the most senior officials of a Canadian government Agency prefer to conceal the truth rather than acknowledge it.

1.81 We would like to take this opportunity Senators on behalf of the women and men we represent, and indeed all Canadians, to thank your Committee for having been at the forefront of the effort to ask pertinent questions, to keep asking them and to publicly state when you didn’t get answers to them. Democracy would be much improved if your actions became the standard rather than the exception to public governance.

1.82 In that vein we would like to conclude by alerting you to a number of issues that we suspect will be of interest to you. Like you, we are determined to see the truth emerge about the reality of what is occurring with respect to the capacity and inclination of CBSA management to discharge the enforcement duties, which this government has rightly laid upon us. Since we last appeared before your Committee we have learned of specific circumstances that serve as alarming indicators of CBSA’s senior management unwillingness to discharge enforcement duties and we urge you to explore them further by questioning CBSA officials.

1.83 We have become aware of the following:

1.84 CBSA uses a Border Management Plan (BMP) to set artificial numerical targets for vehicle and vessel searches, without regard to the goal of finding contraband or any result beyond the search itself. Literally, this “numbers game” is a public relations exercise that focuses on having more searches performed rather than on finding anything. In fact, intelligence based, targeted high-risk searches are routinely discouraged because of the time involved to carry out such searches and so that easier searches – to pad the numbers – can occur. As you know, more security is not necessarily better security, although it does permit unreliable claims to be made.

1.85 Linked to that deceit is a system of management bonuses based on managers achieving BMP numerical quotas and for running operations under budget. Providing financial incentives to managers in this fashion is an outright encouragement to avoid doing enforcement related duties, which does nothing short of corrupt the law enforcement mandate of CBSA.

1.86 There is a widespread policy, despite Front-Line Customs Officer objection, to admit persons into Canada notwithstanding the fact they were caught attempting to smuggle guns or drugs into Canada. This constitutes criminal inadmissibility under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

1.87 As is always the case we are in a position to substantiate these newer findings and it is our hope that you will question CBSA officials in a view of seeking explanations for what has been reported to us and what justifications exists for such measures that are clearly contradictory to the public interest of Canadians.

1.88 This brief is respectfully presented without prejudice.

1.89 Thank you.

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