May 25, 2005

Part 2: Global Players, Perqs, Privilege & Those in the Inner Circle of World Players

Note: There are two related posts, this and the one which follows it on peacekeeping, entitled: A World View, Peacekeeping and the UN -- What if there is a mistake? Or worse? NJC


What follows is an idiosyncratic tour of what interested me, based on several items which came to my attention lately or which I found while on the way to something else.

There are some familiar names, ones which have made the news lately--though more likely the online news since the MSM prefer the status quo and do not adequately research nor report on anything which might really change that status quo.


Perqs, Privilege & Those in the Inner Circle of World Players

Remember Eleanore Clitheroe's tenure at Ontario Hydro and the outrage when her perquisites became public knowledge? Well, read this. Maurice Strong did not garner the same outrage but . . . . if you ever wanted to combine a large and secure salary with flitting around the world, taking care of . . . . affairs (your own? . . . . well, somebody's), he has been a master of acquiring such positions.

Today, I re-read this and it is full of details of interest to anyone desirous of knowing more about:

Maurice Strong, Ontario Hydro, "public-private partnerships", the fine line--or lack thereof--between public money and private interests, sustainable development, privatizing Ontario Hydro, state-sponsored industrial growth, mingling of public and private, Pierre Trudeau, PetroCanada, water (check an article on Canada's PM, Strong and Zenon water in Canada Free Press), rain-forest land deals (Costa Rica -- scroll down for "Maurice Strong, the UN & "Collectivist Tides" -&- Flight of the Earth Council from Costa Rica", May 20, 05 or link to it here and scroll down), connections to the most powerful people in Canada. You will recognize the names; they keep cropping up.


Book excerpt online at Western Standard: Rae Days: The Rise and Follies of the NDP by Thomas Walkom, 1994, Pages 245-257. The excerpt is from Chapter 13: "Mo of the Jungle: On and off the privatization bandwagon", posted by Kevin Steel on May 15, 2005 at 12:55 PM

September 1992 Another crisis. . . . over Ontario Hydro. . . . Although nominally under government control, Hydro had operated almost as a law unto itself . . . .

[. . . . ] Hydro had borrowed heavily to pay for Darlington, Pickering, and the province's other nuclear plants. By 1992, it found itself with a massive $36-billion debt.

[. . . . ] [Bob] Rae turned to Stephen Lewis for advice.

[. . . . ] The fixer's name was Maurice Strong. When [Stephen ] Lewis suggested Rae hire Strong to run Ontario Hydro, the premier thought it a capital idea.

[. . . . ] What defined Strong's style was the elaborate network of friends, partners, and acquaintances he created--a network that wound through the business, political, and intelligence communities of three continents. In particular, Strong's life was interwoven with New York banking, U.S. oil interests, Canadian big business, and the Liberal party. As journalist Elaine Dewar points out in an intriguing Saturday Night magazine feature piece on Strong, the same names kept appearing in his life: the Texas Company, the Rockefellers, the Loebs, the Bronfmans, Power Corp., and the Paul Martins--both senior and junior. In Ottawa, one of the influential Liberal mandarins Strong kept up with was Saul Rae, Bob's father.

[. . . . ] reminiscent of George Smiley, the self-effacing master spy of John le Carré's novels . . .

[. . . . ] Strong worked to spy on suspected Communists in the Canada--U.S.S.R. Friendship Association next door (the Friendship Association's wartime treasurer would later become one of Strong's business partners). . . .

. . . Africa and the Middle East, Strong . . . U.S. oil interests embroiled in the region's politics. . . .

[. . . . ] In 1968, . . . Canadian International Development Agency [CIDA] . . . .

[. . . . ] picked by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to head Petro-Canada, . . . .

. . . state-sponsored industrial growth, the Canada Development Investment Corp. . . . .AZL Resources Inc., which itself was connected to Saudi Arabian arms dealer and Middle East political wheeler-dealer Adnan Kashoggi.

[. . . . ] pump out the water that sustained this valley and pipe it to Denver.

By 1992, the environment was the issue. . . . U.N. Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro . . . Maurice Strong.

[. . . . ] chairman of Ontario Hydro.

. . . Strong's signature throughout his business life had been the "mingling of public and private in the cause of public policy." . . . . musing publicly about privatizing [. . . . ]

Hydro had kept the entire Ontario-based Canadian nuclear industry alive. . . . Inflated Hydro contracts. . . uranium mines of Elliot Lake, . . .

[. . . . ] Maurice Strong, . . . . required to put himself at arm's length from business affairs that might create a conflict-of-interest. . . . had taken the Hydro job on the condition that he be permitted to continue jetting around the world to minister to those he continued to hold.

[. . . . ] The Hydro chair travelled the world at will. . . .

[. . . . ] Strong had begun negotiations to purchase a 12,500 hectare rain forest in Costa Rica. Opposition MPPS pointed out that Strong had investments in Costa Rica and questioned why a crown corporation that was $36 billion in debt needed a rain forest. The newspapers had a field day with, as one Toronto Star headline writer called him, "Mo of the Jungle."

Strong, . . . . Jungle acquisition . . . . sustainable development. . . . .

[. . . . ] Strong . . . privatizing Hydro,

[. . . . ] Inside government, the crisis in Hydro. . . . the "debt spiral."

[. . . . ] characteristic management style. . . . .jetting back and forth to his headquarters in Geneva, his ranch in Colorado, and to other interests around the world, returning from time to time to make major decisions.

[. . . . ] More important though, Strong had laid the foundation. Whichever party won the next election would inherit a utility in which the groundwork for privatization had already been done.


I have tried to indicate the scope of the chapter by what is included above. Frankly, the book sounds quite intriguing. So does Maurice Strong . . . . . if you like government control and management of your life . . . . . . for the greater good, of course. . . .




"You always had to clean up the mess after him" posted by Kevin Steel, May 19, 05

Peter Foster [author of Blue-eyed Sheiks] has an interesting piece in the Financial Post "The Prince of Power" about Maurice Strong and "global salvationism." Global salvationism is a term used by David Henderson, former chief economist for the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, in his book, The Role of Business in the Modern World. On global salvationism Foster writes:

[. . . . ] "A former colleague of Strong at Dome remembers him as a good wheeler-dealer, 'but you always had to clean up the mess after him.'"

Strong resigned as the UN Special Envoy to North Korea a month ago while the allegations against Park are being investigated. Whatever will happen to North Korea without Maurice and the UN? [. . . . ]




Saddam's Business Partners from the May 30, 2005 issue: How the Oil-for-Food scandal happened and why it matters, by Stephen F. Hayes, 05/30/2005, Volume 010, Issue 35, via Newsbeat1

The details of a U.N.-supervised program allowing Hussein to sell more oil in order to better provide for his people were debated for another year, with U.N. negotiators, encouraged by France and Russia, acceding to Hussein's many demands. One concession, little noticed at the time, was a provision that would allow Hussein to choose who bought and sold his oil, pending approval by the U.N. On December 10, 1996, the deal was struck.

[. . . . ] Officials at the highest levels of the Iraqi regime--including Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan, Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, and Oil Minister Amir Muhammad Rashid--chose the recipients.

The U.N. did not see any of this until . . . . The Iraqis, however, kept scrupulous records of each step in their bribery scheme.

[. . . . ] AT A SENATE HEARING LAST TUESDAY, the Coleman-Levin investigators highlighted the bribes the Iraqi regime paid to foreign officials from Britain, Russia, and France. The dramatic testimony of British member of parliament George Galloway, . . . . well-known apologist for Saddam Hussein, . . .

Two other men under investigation by the Coleman-Levin committee, however, were close advisers to the two chief opponents of the Iraq war--Jacques Chirac and Vladimir Putin.

[. . . . ] And last month, a criminal complaint against South Korean Tongsun Park, who also acted on Hussein's behalf, mentions "U.N. Official #1" and "U.N. Official #2" as recipients of bribes from the former Iraqi regime. The two officials remain unnamed. Many news articles have pointed out that Park is a longtime friend of former U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and a business associate of Maurice Strong, an adviser to Kofi Annan who currently serves as the U.N. envoy to the six-party talks on North Korea. Both men have denied any wrongdoing.

So has Kojo Annan, Kofi Annan's son. The younger Annan was consulting for the Swiss firm Cotecna while the firm was bidding to win a contract to monitor the Oil-for-Food program. Cotecna won the contract on December 31, 1998, the same day Kojo Annan's consultancy ended. Cotecna continued to pay Kojo some $2,500 per month as part of a "non-compete" clause. The payments continued until February 2004. Both Annans and Cotecna contend that Kojo's work had nothing to do with Oil-for-Food.




Liberals won't bring Canadian oil-for-food angle under microscope by Judi McLeod, Canadafreepress.com, May 19, 2005

The Liberals nixed any notion for an examination of Canada's oil-for-food role and also opposed any mention of Canadian companies implicated in the affair. The examination was requested by Stockwell Day, the Official Opposition's Foreign Affairs critic. [. . . . ]





Thursday Sep 30, 2004 GENEVA: CANADIAN UN RIGHTS CHIEF WANTS WORLD BODY PERSONNEL IN DARFUR INCREASED

Canadian jurist Louise Arbour, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, says the UN should massively boost staff numbers in Sudan's embattled Darfur region to help protect refugees.
[. . . . ]



Louise Arbour welcomed as new United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

Minority Rights Group International congratulate Louise Arbour on taking up her new post as High Commissioner for Human Rights following the tragic death of Sergio Vieira de Mello in a terrorist attack in Baghdad August 2003. Louise Arbour brings a wealth of valuable experience to the including her period as Chief Prosecutor of the UN International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda




Is it promotion of minority rights or is that a pretext or cover for other controls and coercion. . . or for promotion of the UN itself? (see below) In the realm of control and coercion, think of the NGO's. Who decides who represents us? I don't remember an election or canvassing of opinion on them. Think of the influence of NGO's in over some aspects of the UN agenda. Who are in control of UN human rights and the like. (Think where some of the most repressive states in the world are positioned in the UN.)

Note: The following quotation came from the same source as the quotation with congratulations for Mme. Arbour

Using the United Nations to promote respect for minority rights and, incidentally, itself.

Much of the work of the UN on human and minority rights can seem inaccessible and distant particularly to those who are the victims of prejudice, discrimination or exclusion. Yet NGOs and minorities themselves can play a hugely important role in the work of the UN and by using the UN system effectively they can promote and strengthen not only the rights of minority communities, but the UN system itself. MRG has produced an essential guide, 'Minority Rights: A Guide to United Nations Procedures and Institutions' which aims to encourage people belonging to 20 minorities and the groups themselves to use the procedures and forums of the 20 United Nations increasingly and effectively in order to promote respect for their legitimate rights. Fully updated in 2004 to incorporate changes and developments in the UN system, MRG's guide has been written and revised by experts and offers a useful and effective tool towards using the UN to promote respect for minority rights.


Training Manual

I could not download it but check here.

United Nations Guide for Minorities

Neither non-governmental organizations (NGOs) nor members of the public have any decision-making role in the UN's deliberations. However, NGOs are essential to the UN's work, both in providing support for UN programs and in lobbying the UN and its member States to adopt new initiatives or act with greater effectiveness. At some levels, the UN does allow NGOs to participate in its meetings, but final decision-making is restricted to member States. (The only exception to this general rule is the International Labour Organization , whose unique tripartite system gives equal representation to trade unions and employers' organizations, in addition to governments.

[. . . . ] Many of these bodies come under the umbrella of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which reports to the General Assembly.

Subsidiary to ECOSOC is the central human rights body in the UN, the 53-member Commission on Human Rights.

[. . . . ] Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

Although they are not specifically provided for in the UN Charter itself, non-governmental organizations are vital to many of the UN's functions. The Economic and Social Council has adopted arrangements for appropriate NGOs to be granted "consultative status" with ECOSOC, which enables the organizations to receive UN documentation and participate in many UN meetings. Both international and national NGOs are eligible to apply for consultative status, so long as they are concerned with issues that are relevant to the UN's work. There are approximately 1,000 NGOs in consultative status with the UN at this time.

Organizations applying for consultative status must fill in a questionnaire and provide detailed information about their structure, finances, and other matters. The application process and other matters relating to NGOs are handled by the Non-Governmental Organizations Section of the Department of Economic, Social and Cultural Affairs (DESA) in the United Nations in New York.

Defining human rights

[. . . . ] Since the most effective instruments are generally those that enjoy a high degree of agreement, governments generally prefer to have consensus on the text. This makes it more likely that a treaty will be widely ratified or that a declaration represents a meaningful political commitment by States. [. . . . ]


If the UN is able to find out anything about the finances of NGO's in Canada, it is doing better than the citizens who actually pay an unknown amount of money to them via the government. Again, how does one get to be part of an NGO and recognized as such by one's government, relevant to all Canadians since NGO support comes from taxpayers . . . and then how are NGO's chosen? and by whom? to represent some, if not all, Canadians at the UN? What if someone doesn't agree with them as our representatives? To whom does one turn?


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