July 27, 2006: Symposium & Essay

Is Muslim immigration uniquely dangerous to Canada? Symposium: Terror From the North Jamie Glazov, July 25, 06
canadiancoalition.com/forum/messages/17882.shtml

A month ago, in early June 2006, 17 Muslim males were rounded up by Canadian authorities for planning terror strikes within Ontario. What did these arrests signify? Frontpage has assembled a distinguished panel to discuss this issue with us today. [....]

FP: Rachel Marsden, Stewart Bell, Patrick Grady, Michael Marzolini, and Robert Spencer, welcome to Frontpage Symposium.

[....] FP: Stewart Bell, what is your take? The “enlightened” Canadian establishment dealt with this terror phenomenon pretty strangely, no? What’s Canada’s problem?

Bell:[....].Having said that, it’s clear there was a deliberate strategy to avoid identifying them as Muslims at the RCMP news conference. I think the reason may have had more to do with strategic thinking than political correctness.

The RCMP and CSIS can't do their jobs properly unless they improve their relationship with the various Canadian Muslim communities. ... ( ... since imams like Aly Hindy and like-minded lobby groups have done their best to make sure Muslims think the worst of CSIS and the RCMP). [....]

Grady: You ask "what is Canada’s problem?" To an economist such as myself, the answer seems obvious,.... To paraphrase Clinton’s campaign slogan, "it’s the demographics, stupid." By this, I mean that Canada has allowed and is continuing to allow into the country too many fundamentalist Muslim immigrants, who bring along their jihad ideology and deeply ingrained hatred of the West with their luggage. Once here in our diverse and tolerant country, they’re free to poison the minds of their children who in turn become the homegrown jihadis like the Toronto 17 that we’re talking about today and that cause so much angst in Canada.

[....] Mississauga has become a real hotbed of radical Islam. [....]

It is not all who cause the angst; it is the extremists, the Islamists.

There is much more.



Diane Francis

Lengthy and worth reading

Why Canada Did Not Join the Iraq Coalition Dec. 2005, posted April 25, 2006, Diane Francis, Shorenstein Fellow Fall 2005, Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government
dianefrancisharvard.blogspot.com/2006/04/
why-canada-did-not-join-iraq-coalition_25.html

INTRODUCTION

On March 17, 2003, two days before the Coalition of the Willing invaded Iraq, Prime Minister Jean Chretien stood up in the House of Commons and read out a terse statement: “Over the last few weeks the UN Security Council has been unable to agree on a new resolution authorizing military action. Canada worked very hard to find a compromise to bridge the gap in the Security Council. Unfortunately, we were not successful. If military action proceeds without a new resolution of the Security Council, Canada will not participate. We have ships in the area as part of our participation in the struggle against terrorism.”

[....] But the Prime Minister’s terse statement had nothing to do with principles, skepticism over intelligence reports about weapons of mass destruction, foreign policy considerations or consistency, Canadian public opinion or press endorsement. It surprised .... Canada [had] even talked to Washington about sending up to 1,500 troops to Iraq but this was suddenly taken off the table causing Canadian Major General Cameron Ross to resign. The nature of the announcement also represented a notable breach of diplomatic protocol ...

The goal of this paper will be to analyze the personality clashes, politics, press coverage, polls, diplomatic infighting and policies leading up to this historic break by Canada from its closest allies, the United States and Britain.

[Assume [....] after each of the following subheadings.]
PART I – THE POLITICS
The Players
A Very Bad Start
Another Unfortunate Incident
Countdown to Shock and Awe
The Political Fallout
II. THE ROLE OF THE POLLS
The English-French Divide on Military Preparedness
III. THE ROLE OF THE PRESS
The French Factor
[The Desmarais family ....]
English Canada
IV. THE ROLE OF POLICY
Absolute Parliamentary and Policy Power
The Incredible Shrinking Military
The Defense Policy Debacle
Butter not Guns
The United Nations Foreign Policy Battle
[Paul Heinbecker was Canada’s Ambassador at the UN from 2000 to 2004 ....]
V. AFTERMATH
VI. CONCLUSION

[....] The Chretien regime was also guilty of insensitivity, diplomatic ineptness and insularity. He was not at all like his predecessor, Brian Mulroney, who was a Clintonesque international networker. Chretien remained a local Quebec politician who put Quebec politics, and his dislike for George Bush, before other considerations. .... However, the failure to adhere to normal diplomatic protocol and the acceptance, even encouragement, of anti-American attitudes within his government has not been in the national interest. Less vicious back-biting, and a more nuanced policy of non-combat Coalition participation, may have accomplished a great deal and repaired a frayed friendship.

Perhaps there was more to Chretien's actions than simply Quebec ... something altogether more ... self-serving ... than the good of Canada. Others have investigated and found some intriguing information.