TOC Tells the Reality -- National Security & Defence Report Nov. 2005

This is the most informative Table of Contents possible; it tells all.

Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence: Report Update 2005 -- pdf issued Nov. 05

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Reading the Report



CHAPTER 2

Border Crossings

Problem 1: Poor Threat Identification at the Border
Problem 2: Long Canadian Security Intelligence Service Processing Times.
Problem 3: Undertrained Part-Time Customs Staff
Problem 4: Unsafe Border Posts.
Problem 5: Arm Customs Officials?



CHAPTER 3

Coasts

Problem 1: Canada’s Vulnerable Coasts.
Problem 2: Coastal Radar - Off the Government’s radar?
Problem 3: Inadequate Short-Range Coastal Patrols
Problem 4: Inadequate Long-Range Coastal Patrols
Problem 5: Canada’s Toothless Coast Guard
Problem 6: No Notification Prior to Arrival
Problem 7: Taking Incoming Vessels at Their Word
Problem 8: Need Network for Maritime Warnings
Problem 9: Unannounced Vessels
Problem 10: Transponders for Smaller Vessels
Problem 11: Dangerous Containers
Problem 12: Lack of Border Officials Abroad
Problem 13: Great Lakes Surveillance
Problem 14: Surveillance of Coasts, Lakes and Rivers
Problem 15: Training Delays



CHAPTER 4

Canadian Forces

Problem 1: Budget Cuts
Problem 2: Capital Acquisitions Falling Behind.
Problem 3: Overheated Operational Tempo
Problem 4: Too Few Personnel – Too High Tempo
Problem 5: Overdue Defence Policy Review
Problem 6: Lack of Large-Scale Training Exercises
Problem 7: The Slow Move to Wainwright



CHAPTER 5

Structure and Coordination of Government

Problem 1: Need for Muscle at the Top
Problem 2: Need for A Strong Team
Problem 3: Coordination at the Top
Problem 4: The Missing National Security Policy
Problem 5: Need for Crisis Command Centres
Problem 6: Need for Canada-U.S. Coordination
Problem 7: Slow Progress at Information-Sharing
Problem 8: Lack of Surveillance Coordination
Problem 9: Intelligence Community Understaffed
Problem 10: Weak Overseas Intelligence
Problem 11: Information Fusion Failures
Problem 12: Lack of Oversight
Problem 13: Coordination Lacking In Coastal Defence.
Problem 14: Allocations of Proceeds of Crime
Problem 15: Canada Too Inward Looking



CHAPTER 6

Ports

Problem 1: Vulnerable Ports
Problem 2: Organized Crime in Ports
Problem 3: Port Perimeters
Problem 4: Insufficient Police at Ports
Problem 5: Inadequate Container Screening
Problem 6: Inadequate Container Supervision
Problem 7: Fragile Ferries



CHAPTER 7

Airports

Problem 1: Screening Checked Baggage
Problem 2: Inadequate Background Checks
Problem 3: No Leadership on Airside Passes
Problem 4: Unprepared Air Crews
Problem 5: Armed Pilots?
Problem 6: Alerting Air Crews
Problem 7: Role of Aircraft Protection Officers
Problem 8: Vulnerable Cockpit Doors
Problem 9: Security Training for Maintenance Workers
Problem 10: Responsibility for Airport Security Needs Clarifying – Who’s in Charge?
Problem 11: Known Shipper Makes Aircraft Insecure
Problem 12: Lack of Security at Fixed-Base Operations
Problem 13: Small Airports are Weak Links in the Aviation Security
Problem 14: Access to Restricted Areas
Problem 15: Airmail and Cargo Goes Unchecked
Problem 16: The Canadian Air Transport Authority Intelligence Gap[Is this not CATSA?]
Problem 17: Airport Policing is Inadequate
Problem 18: Lack of Transparency for Security Improvements
Problem 19: Air Travellers’ Security Charge
Problem 20: Unnecessary Secrecy
Problem 21: Lack of Financial Transparency



CHAPTER 8

Emergency Preparedness

Problem 1: Lack of Emergency Management
Problem 2: Emergency Ad Hockery
Problem 3: Inability to Deploy Police in an Emergency
Problem 4: No Role for Reserves
Problem 5: No Domestic Role for the DART
Problem 6: Emergency Caches Mismanaged
Problem 7: Lack of Equipment for First Responders
Problem 8: Institutional “Lessons Learned” Memory Blank
Problem 9: Lack of Centralized Health Protection
Problem 10: Poor Collaboration
Problem 11: Emergency Public Communications
Problem 12: Poor Communications Equipment
Problem 13: First Responders Out of Loop
Problem 14: Weak Central Knowledge Base on Critical Infrastructure
Problem 15: Lack of Leadership on Best Practices
Problem 16: Large Cities Should Be Helping Regions



APPENDIX I

Corrections, and Omissions



APPENDIX II

Order of Reference



APPENDIX III

Who the Committee Heard From



APPENDIX IV

Biographies of Committee Members



APPENDIX V

Biographies of Committee Secretariat



APPENDIX VI

Index of Recommendations

Excerpt:

APPENDIX I

Corrections and Omissions

[. . . . ]

COMMITTEE COMMENT

Upon review, the Committee believes this recommendation confuses instead of clarifies. It withdraws this recommendation. The Committee is of the view that Transport Canada should not be involved in security issues. It should be involved in other air transportation related regulations, such as airworthiness, but not security. The Committee believes that responsibility for the security of aircraft and the restricted areas of airports should be transferred to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (See Chapter 7, Problem 18, pages 189-190).
Corrections

After initial printing of its January 2003 study of airport security, The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, [. . . ]

#1

RECOMMENDATION VII.1 AS CORRECTED

The Committee recommends that all airport policing directly related to air travel security be removed from the airport authorities and assigned exclusively to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who can in turn contract parts of it to the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority. [CATSA]

[. . . . ]

#2

RECOMMENDATION VII.4 AS CORRECTED

The Committee also recommends that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police be given the authority to contract the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority to supervise all security policing at airports as it relates to passenger, cargo, aircraft and airside security.

[. . . . ]

With regard to improved defence of Canada’s territorial waters, the Committee recommends:

1. Adoption of a layered approach of reporting and monitoring to provide timely warning of vessels approaching Canadian waters.

2. The Coordination of all Canadian resources - including Navy, Coast Guard, Air Force, Army, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, police forces and agencies responsible for intelligence and satellite surveillance - to improve defence of Canada’s coastlines.

3. Greater cooperation and coordination with U.S. counterparts.
(Report: Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility, September 2002, #1, 2, and 3)

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