February 19, 2005

Security: Real Risks and Government Responses -- Note Failure to Act -- and Weasel Words

House of Commons -- A Reasonable CPC Question, The Deputy PM, & the Knight of the Damsel in Distress

First, check this House of Commons exchange, and then read what follows it, only a portion of the report detailing Chapters 2 and 3, Border Security and Coast recommendations, government (in)action, and high priorities for action NOW. That's means in this budget.

It is almost as if the Speaker were in collusion, all talk--no action--no resources--no manpower.


Border Security
(1155) to (1200)

Mr. Russ Hiebert (South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, CPC): Mr. Speaker, at the founding meeting of the border caucus last week, MPs from border ridings across the country expressed concern about the safety of border service employees and about our national security. We have all heard stories in recent weeks of people running the border in cars. I have heard directly from border workers in my own riding of people simply walking across the line.

The border service appears to be lacking the resources to deal effectively with this problem. Could the Deputy Prime Minister please share with the House the plans she has to deal with this critical issue?

Hon. Anne McLellan (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Lib.):
Mr. Speaker, there are actually two components to the question, first of course deals with the situation of the safety of our CBSA officers on the front lines. In fact, we have completed risk assessments in relation to all customs locations. We are ensuring that our front line officers have both the training and the tools they need, whether that includes batons, vests, pepper spray, and so on. I want to reassure the hon. member that we are very committed to the safety of our front line officers.

In terms of resources, quite--

Mr. Speaker, are you going to cut me off?

The Speaker: Yes. I am sure all hon. members were enjoying the answer, but we do have time limits.


[Translation] [Ed's emphasis]


I kid you not! This is the way the Speaker got Anne MacLellan, Minister of Insecurity out of that question. Since when does the Speaker get the right to do this? To end what might have been a real, honest answer? Ah, he probably knew what was coming -- or what could not be allowed to surface.



Now for what our Deputy Prime Minister--Minister of Insecurity and Speaking for PM on Touchy Issues--does not want to admit into the light of Parliament.

A portion of a 300 page report on Security

CHAPTER 2

Border Crossings


Problem 1: Poor Threat Identification at the Border

Officials from the Canada Border Services Agency—formerly part of the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency and Citizenship and Immigration Canada—do not have adequate tools or training to identify persons who constitute a threat to Canada.

The potential damage to the Canadian economy and other consequences that would come with allowing a terrorist to infiltrate the U.S. through Canada are massive. The Government has acknowledged this in its April 2004 National Security Policy.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

That by June 30, 2003, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency and Immigration Canada offer substantive evidence that they have addressed the Auditor General’s recommendations to improve training to help airport personnel identify persons “likely to engage in criminal activities or endanger the safety of Canadians.”

. . . police databanks . . . provide their employees with the training and technology required to take advantage of these databanks. (Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports, January 2003, #I. 2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Accessing Databanks
The government introduced Integrated Primary Inspection Line (IPIL) technology to airports. The system is an automated support tool used by border officials to scrutinize entrants by scanning both Canada Border Services Agency and Citizenship and Immigration Canada enforcement databanks.

[. . . . ] The Auditor General’s March 2004 report was heavily critical of the “watch lists” the inspection line is supposed to query. The Auditor General cited numerous examples of duplication, missing names, classification errors, and even names appearing that should have been removed. [21] . . . .

Training

Auditor General . . . “slow” progress. . . had concerns with regards to the adequacy and effectiveness of training, especially with regards to student workers. [24]

[. . . . ] Canada Border Services Agency has yet to announce that all customs officers – including part-timers – will receive the full amount of training that the Agency obviously believes that full-time officers need to perform their duties.

Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Judy Sgro wrote to one Committee member that “All officers working at airports and land borders are trained to access police databanks in Canada (CPIC) and the United States (NCIC).” [26] [This is contradicted; search "Customs Excise Union" and "Rainbow Bridge in Ontario" below]

[. . . . ] The Auditor General reported in March 2004 that the primary inspection line was not linked to the RCMP’s database of outstanding Canada-wide arrest warrants. [27] It should be.

[. . . . ]Problem 2: Long Canadian Security Intelligence Service Processing Times

Refugee and immigration claims are delayed for up to two years because the Canadian Security Intelligence Service does not have the resources to quickly process the files it receives from Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Because Canada does not keep close tabs on refugee claimants or applicants for immigration, a person who poses a threat to Canada could disappear into the country long before anyone knew.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that sufficient resources be allocated to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to deal with them. (Report: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #17 A)

[. . . . ] Canadian Security Intelligence Service reported . . . . The determinant factors are case type (Refugee Front End Screening Program or Application for Permanent Residence), where the case originated (inside or outside Canada), in what form it was first received (hard copy or electronic) and whether CSIS had an objection to the application.

[. . . . ] The median turnaround time for cases that raised no security concern was 31 days. Where there were security concerns, the median turnaround time took approximately 7 to 10 times longer (depending on the type of concern raised). [31]

[. . . . ] Electronic applications take about a third as long to process as hard copy applications

[. . . . ] However, there has been no significant improvement in the turnaround time for screening permanent residency requests where there is a security concern. In 2004, the review committee reported that the median turnaround time was 14 to 20 months, [33] compared to the 15-month turnaround time it had reported in 2003. [34]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

* Increase staff

More personnel are needed, not only in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service but also at Citizenship and Immigration Canada. [. . . . ]

* Go Electronic . . . much quicker . . .

* Implement the Safe Third Country Agreement and report on its effects [. . . . ]

Problem 3: Undertrained Part-Time Customs Staff

HIGH PRIORITY


Frontline border agents are clearly key components in our border security system. The judgments they make on behalf of several departments, from Citizenship and Immigration Canada to Agriculture Canada to Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, are critical to Canada’s national security.

Students and other temporary workers do not now receive adequate training and are not required to pass the same tests as full-time officers.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that all personnel on the primary inspection line be trained to the highest standard, without exceptions for short-term staff. (Report: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #15. A)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

In September 2003, the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency told the Committee that “ALL Customs officers, including students, receive the training and the tools that they require to perform their duties effectively and efficiently.” [37]

The Customs Excise Union (CEU) disagrees. According to CEU National President Ron Moran, “Students are not at all fully trained…They don’t have to pass rigorous testing like professional officers, and are therefore not supposed to do the full job…but they often do.” [38]



[Pause here and re-read that. Students without full training are manning our borders and the CUSTOMS EXCISE UNION revealed this. Now, put that in context with the fact that whistleblower protection is being denied one of our Quebec RCMP officers who criticized the closing down of detachments in PQ -- termed "redeployment" by the Deputy PM. He has been ordered not to attend union meetings, I believe. The reference will be on this site today or tomorrow. Now, to continue.]


The Canada Border Services Agency has yet to demonstrate that it has enough customs officers to assure consistent, year-round, professional staffing.

Claims that students don’t need as much training because they do different jobs and are supervised by full-time officers are simply not credible. For example, during one 24 hour period at the Rainbow Bridge in Ontario this summer, the border crossing staff consisted of 16 full-time officers and 39 students. [39] Students served on the primary inspection line as well as the secondary line.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

[. . . . ] Either more full-time officers must be hired, or part-time officers must receive identical training.

Problem 4: Unsafe Border Posts

Border posts are understaffed. Too many posts are staffed by one person, who has little or no hope of getting quick support from police or other border officers when there is an emergency or a surge in traffic. [40] The practice of leaving customs officials alone is risky for the officials and risky for Canadian security.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

ensure that no customs officers work alone at posts. (Report: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #15. B)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Border officials still work alone at most border crossings. According to a Border Services Agency document leaked to the National Post in November 2004, after the on-the-job death of a border official working was alone, 103 of Canada’s 160 land and maritime border crossings are classified as “work-alone sites.” [41]

[. . . . ] risk . . . . The Committee has not been made aware of the contents of the job hazard analysis.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

* Release the job hazard analysis [. . . . ]

* Deploy more officers, ensure no officials work alone


[. . . . ] By this time it should be apparent whether there is some new technology available that would make a lone customs officers both safe and effective. If there isn’t, hire more people. More customs officers should be hired.

Problem 5: Arm Customs Officials?

[. . . . ] to back up their designated authority. The union argues that customs officers need weapons for their self-protection.

[. . . . No] The Committee would welcome any further evidence
the government or others might be able to provide on the pros and cons of arming customs officers. It will address this issue further if it receives new evidence. [. . . . ]

[How much more evidence is necessary? Common sense should prevail. NJC]

CHAPTER 3

Coasts

Problem 1: Canada’s Vulnerable Coasts
Canada has thousands of kilometres of coastline and hundreds of harbours that go unwatched. Limited patrols, such as Aurora maritime patrol aircraft over-flights, occur on an infrequent, ad hoc basis. This lack of maritime domain awareness makes it easier for organized crime to traffic contraband, harder for officials to separate commercial and pleasure vessels from legitimate threats, and especially difficult for Canada to assert its sovereignty claims over remote areas, like the arctic.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

[. . . . ] (Report: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #10)
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

. . . outlines a six-point plan. . . . While short on specifics, deliverables and cost projections, the goals it sets out are good ones. They include: . . . .

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

[. . . . ] But the recommendation was made in 2002, and it is now almost 2005. . . . . The government needs to translate goals into action faster.

Problem 2: Coastal Radar - Off the Government’s radar?


Surveillance of the waters off Canada’s coasts is patchy—most of the time the government does not have a good idea of what is going in Canada’s territorial waters. The lack of a real time electronic picture makes it difficult for officials to distinguish between legitimate vessels and those that are potential threats.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended at least eight and possibly more High Frequency Surface Wave Radar (HFSWR) sites be installed to monitor areas of heavy traffic on Canada’s coasts, plus other coastal sites that terrorists might target as alternates to high-traffic ports. [44] (Report: Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #2.1)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

. . . . will complete . . . . are expected . . . . are planned . . . . will provide


CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

Life in the Senate seems positively electric compared to the pace at which Canada is moving to upgrade its coastal surveillance. . . .

Problem 3: Inadequate Short-Range Coastal Patrols

Canada has thousands of kilometres of coastline that are not adequately patrolled from the sky. The Canadian Forces has been forced to reduce the number of flying hours of its Aurora patrol aircraft. Neither the Navy nor the Canadian Coast Guard have adequate resources to maintain an effective surveillance framework on our maritime approaches.

[. . . . ] Tactical drones (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles – UAVs) should be introduced as surveillance aids on both coasts. (Report: Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #2.2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

No tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles have been deployed to monitor Canada’s coasts, and there are no plans to deploy them.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

[. . . . ] For a relatively small price tag, they could fill in the gaps in our surveillance framework by our overburdened and carry some of the load that Aurora patrol aircraft are not.

Problem 4: Inadequate Long-Range Coastal Patrols

[. . . . ] The government has been studying the use of strategic drones for a number of years.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

[. . . . ] If the tests prove to be effective, as expected, the government should make money available immediately.

Problem 5: Canada’s Toothless Coast Guard

HIGH PRIORITY

The Coast Guard cannot contribute to Canada’s national security in a significant way because it lacks the mandate, the experience, the equipment, and the institutional focus to do so.

Security is but one among several of the Canadian Coast Guard’s priorities, along with protection of the environment, support of scientific research, facilitation of trade and commerce, navigation safety and emergency response.



[The Coast Guard is obviously suffering from a surfeit of priorities -- something like the PM's speech.]


The Coast Guard does not have a constabulary function, it is not armed, and it reports to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, all of which contribute to a focus away from coastal security.

Despite its name, the Coast Guard doesn’t play a serious role in guarding our coasts.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

[. . . ] an independent agency responsible to Parliament. It should continue to carry out its duties – search and rescue, ice-breaking, navigational aids, buoy tending, boat safety, fisheries and environment protection – and take on new responsibilities for national security. On security assignments, the Coast Guard would come under the direction of Department of National Defence coastal operations centres (Trinity and Athena). (Report: Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #4.1)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

[. . . . ] The government failed to make the Coast Guard an independent agency.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

* Properly fund on-water patrols and demonstrate that the pace of patrols has increased

The government must turn its promises into action and provide the funds and personnel to increase on-water patrols.

* Move the Coast Guard into the Deputy Prime Minister’s Portfolio

. . . the Coast Guard should report to Parliament through the Deputy Prime Minister.

* Refocus the Coast Guard’s Mandate Toward Security.

The Deputy Prime Minister’s central role with regards to security and borders would assist in refocussing the Coast Guard on security-related responsibilities.

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